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Firm Regulation and Profit-Sharing: A Real Option Approach 
Summary 
To avoid high profit levels often experienced in countries where monopolies in public 
utility sectors are regulated through price-cap mechanisms, several regulatory agencies 
have recently introduced profit-sharing (PS) clauses aimed at obtaining price reductions 
to the benefit of consumers. However, the implementation of these PS clauses has often 
turned out to be severely con- trained by the incompleteness of the price-cap itself and 
the non-verifiability of firms’profits. This paper studies the properties of a second-best 
optimal PS mechanism designed by the regulator to induce the regulated monopolist to 
divert part of its profits to custormers. In a dynamic model where a reg- ulated 
monopolist manages a long-term franchise contract and the regulator has the option to 
revoke the contract if there are serious welfare losses, we first derive the welfare 
maximising PS mechanism under verifiability of prof- its. Subsequently, we explore the 
sustainability of the PS mechanism under non-verifiability of profits. In a infinite-
horizon game, it is showed that the dynamic sustainability of the PS clause crucially 
depends upon the magni- tude of the regulator’s revocation cost: the higher this cost, the 
lower the profit shared and the less frequent the regulator’s PS introduction. Finally, we 
present the endogenous and dynamic price adjustment which follows the adoption of the 
investigated PS mechanism in a price-cap regulation setting. 
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Recent European liberalization and US experience in regulation of public util-
ities shows that price-cap regulation (PCR) allows prices to diverge greatly
from actual costs and often generate "abnormal" pro￿ts for the ￿rm.1 Reg-
ulators dislike high corporate pro￿ts under PCR because they reduce the
welfare of consumers and - favouring the ￿rm - downgrade the regulator￿ s
reputation for being able to set the "right" price of the service. This is why,
in the last decade, PCRs have been modi￿ed in a variety of ways in order to
induce the regulated ￿rms to rebate part of their pro￿ts to customers. Pre-
cisely, regulators have often advocated "pro￿t-sharing" (PS) - or "earning-
sharing" - schemes to make the regulated ￿rm share with its customers a
fraction of the pro￿ts it generates beyond a certain level.
In the European experience of regulation, the textbook example for pro￿t-
sharing refers to the price-cuts implemented by the British electricity regu-
lator in between 1994 and 1995, well before the o¢ cial price review in 1999:
since the initial price control for the electricity companies turned out to be
over-generous allowing high pro￿ts, the regulator intervened reducing prices
and thus returning some of those "excess" pro￿ts to consumers.2 Sappington
(2002), among others, shows that these PS practices are usually introduced
in the US telecommunication industry by the regulator in the form of direct
payment to customers or reduced prices for key services.3 The present paper
mainly deals with this latter form of PS.
A fundamental feature of these real-world PS mechanisms is, thus, the
discretion left in the hands of the regulator which entitles the regulator him-
self to adjust the PCR adopted ex-ante calling for an unilateral "renewal"
of the regulatory contract. By its own discretionary nature, though, the PS
mechanism allows for disputes and ex-post re-contracting between the regu-
1This drawback of the price-cap as an incentive mechanism stems from its inability
to set a contingent price that incorporates all the uncertainties faced by the ￿rm in each
period of the regulatory contract.
2Similar price-cuts have since been made by other regulators as British Gas Transco
(gas transmission and distribution), National Grid Company (electricity transmission)
(Green, 1997). Other often quoted European examples are about Oftel, the British tlc
regulator (Armstrong et al.(1994)), and Ofwat, the water industry regulator in England
and Wales (see the Ofwat￿ s home page for the current pro￿t-sharing mechanism).
3Reduction in prices has been widely employed to regulate intrastate accounting rates
a⁄ecting earnings of telecommunication providers (Sappington, 2002).
2lator and the regulated ￿rm about both the level of pro￿t that should trigger
the sharing rule and the dynamic path that the regulated price should fol-
low. It has been informally argued that this may make it substantially more
di¢ cult to implement PS prescriptions.4
The aim of this paper is to investigate the properties of second-best op-
timal PS mechanisms, designed by regulators to induce regulated ￿rms to
divert part of their "excessive" pro￿ts to custormers. Speci￿cally, we analize
a dynamic game with two players: a regulated monopolist who manages a
long-term franchise contract to provide a public utility service (e.g.: water
supply, waste managment, gas or electricity distribution, etc.); and a welfare-
maximising regulator who has the right, during the contractual relationship,
to ask for price reductions from the regulated ￿rm, and to revoke the franchise
contract if he perceives the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t as "excessively" high. We model the
regulator￿ s "outside" option to revoke the contract as a perpetual call option
where the regulator - considering the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t as an underlying asset -
has to determine when to pay an exercise price to re-acquire managment of
the utility and to re-determine provision of the service. Speci￿cally, the game
may last an in￿nite number of periods, and ends once the regulator exercises
the option to revoke the franchise contract. Each period is divided into four
stages: at the ￿rst stage, nature chooses the realization of a random variable,
determining the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t; at the second stage, after having observed the
￿rm￿ s pro￿t, the regulator decides whether or not to ask for a price reduc-
tion; at the third stage, the ￿rm decides whether or not to comply with the
regulator￿ s prescription; ￿nally, at the fourth stage, the regulator, based on
the price set by the monopolist, may revoke the contract.
It turns out that the assumption on pro￿t veri￿ability a⁄ects the analysis
of the game beginning with the second stage: indeed, when the pro￿t - and
the other regulatory variables - are observable but nonveri￿able, the regulator
cannot force the ￿rm to cut "excessive" pro￿ts as "no court or other third
party will accept to arbitrate a claim based on the value taken by these
variables"5. This implies that - when pro￿t are not veri￿able - the ￿rm can
e⁄ectively choose whether to comply or not with the PS rule, retaining all
pro￿ts above the pro￿t threshold that triggers the PS until the regulator
revokes the contract. In contrast, when the veri￿ability of pro￿t is assumed,
4As stressed by Green (1997), the PS would require audited cost information for cal-
culating allowable pro￿ts (and prices) levels, information which are often very di¢ cult to
be collected by the regulator.
5SalaniØ (1997, p. 177).
3the regulator￿ s PS prescription reduces the game to a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er
to the ￿rm.
For the sake of clarity, the analysis is broken into two parts. As a bench-
mark, we ￿rstly investigate the simpler, though less realistic, case where the
￿rm￿ s pro￿t is veri￿able and - consequently - the PS mechanism imposes
contractual obligations contingent on realized pro￿ts; then, we move to the
more realistic case of pro￿t￿ s non-veri￿ability.
In the ￿rst part of the analysis, after having formally de￿ned the PS clause
we investigate, we identify the pro￿t threshold that determines the regulator￿ s
introduction of the welfare-maximizing PS rule. We then demonstrate that
at such a pro￿t level the regulator is indi⁄erent between contract closure and
imposing the PS. Hence, we formally show that in the unique equilibrium
of the game the monopolist will always comply with the regulator￿ s PS rule
and the contract will never be revoked; the regulator will impose the PS rule
whenever the pro￿t is higher than the identi￿ed trigger level.
In the second part of our analysis we turn to the case of pro￿t non ver-
i￿ability. The main di⁄erence with the previous case is that a monopolist,
who decides not to comply with the PS rule, can - now - retain all the pro￿ts
above pro￿t￿ s threshold triggering PS until the regulator calls for contract
closure. The regulator will now revoke the contract, say at period t, only if
revocation at that period is e⁄ectively his best reply. In other words, in the
absence of pro￿t veri￿ability, an incentive constraint imposing dynamic op-
timality of the revocation policy must be satis￿ed in order to make credible
the regulator￿ s revocation threat.
In this setting, we formally show that for all the pro￿t levels higher that
the pro￿t threshold which makes the regulator indi⁄erent between contract
closure and imposing the PS, it is sequentially optimal for the regulator to
revoke the contract, while revoking the contract for lower pro￿t levels will
never satisfy the sequentiality. Hence, the perfect equilibrium of the game
with pro￿ts non-veri￿ability is also such that the ￿rm complies with the PS
rule chosen by the regulator in each period, as long as the revocation has not
been carried out.6
In equilibrium, the expectation of being able to induce pro￿t-sharing
makes it rational for the regulator not to exercise its option to revoke, and
this fact also makes it rational for the ￿rm to continue to comply with the
6E¢ cient sub-game perfect equilibria in in￿nite-horizon threat-games are investigated
in Klein and O￿ Flaherty, 1993; Shavell and Spier, 2002.
4PS prescription. On the one hand, given that for the monopolist the loss
from revocation of the (in￿nitely-lived) contract is greater than the expected
stream of pro￿t cuts (prescribed by the PS rule), it will be e¢ cient for the
￿rm to continuosly maintain pro￿t at a level lower than the threshold that
triggers the PS. On the other hand, the regulator will revoke the contract for
any pro￿t level higher than the pro￿t threshold that triggers the PS.
Our model also shows that the sustainability of the PS mechanism cru-
cially depends upon the magnitude of the regulator￿ s revocation cost. Such
cost represents a form of capture of the regulator by the ￿rm7: the higher
the revocation cost, the lower the pro￿t shared and the less frequent the
regulator￿ s PS prescription.
Finally, as in our model the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is stochastically determined, the
pro￿t threshold that triggers the PS rule de￿nes an (expected) time interval
after which the monopolist will be asked for the ￿rst time to reduce its price
and a time interval between each pair of regulatory reviews asking for price
reductions. We show that both the equilibrium trigger pro￿t level as well as
the time interval between each pair of regulatory reviews (i.e. the regulatory
lag) positively depend on the regulator￿ s revocation cost.
The present paper is related to two di⁄erent strands of literature. On a
formal level, our paper builds upon the literature on the stochastic control
techniques developed to identify optimal timing rules and optimal barrier reg-
ulations.8 These techniques are widely used in the literature of irreversible in-
vestments,9 and emphasize the option value of delaying investment decisions,
i.e. the value of waiting for better (although never complete) information on
the stochastic evolution of a basic asset.
In reference to the economic literature on the regulation of ￿rms, our pa-
per takes stock of the studies on drastic regulatory changes such as stochastic
regulatory review (Bawa and Sibley, 1984) and expropriation by the regula-
tor (Salant and Woroch,1992; Gilbert and Newbery, 1994). Bawa and Sibley
(1984) show that the ￿rm￿ s incentive to indulge in over-capitalization can be
tempered by the fact that this raises pro￿ts and - consequently - makes it
more likely that the regulator will cut prices; in contrast to their approach,
which emphasizes strategic ￿rm behaviour vis a vis both the likelihood reg-
ulator review and price adjustment, we focus on the regulator￿ s decision to
7For a discussion on the large literature on regulatory capture we refer to La⁄ont and
Tirole (1994, chapt. 11).
8See Harrison and Taksar (1983), Harrison (1985) and Dixit (1993).
9Dixit and Pindyck (1994) is the seminal text in this area.
5impose a regulatory review in the form of a PS rule and on the informational
conditions which makes it enforceable.
Salant and Woroch (1992) and Gilbert and Newbery (1994) present mod-
els on expropriation by the regulator where the price regulation occurs en-
dogenously as a self-enforcing and mutually bene￿cial cooperative equilib-
rium. In both those discrete-time repeated game frameworks, the regulatory
lag does not a⁄ect the players￿behaviour. In contrast, in our continuous-time
repeated game model, the explicit unilateral approach to contract renewal10
- i.e. the regulator sets the PS rule or calls for contract closure - allows us
either to determine the regulatory lags endogenously or to study its determi-
nants. Speci￿cally, in our framework, the endogeneity of the regulatory lag11
consistently belongs both to the level of the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t and the regulator￿ s
revocation cost.
According to the approach of this paper, the regulator￿ s decision to intro-
duce the PS rule is based on welfare consideration and modelled along with
the option to revoke the contract: both these elements are absent - as far as
we know - from the literature on PS and expropriation by the regulator. In-
deed, these considerations allow us to recognize, ￿rstly, that the PS calls for
an intertemporal regulatory setting and, secondly, that market uncertainty
and the regulator￿ s credible threat to close the contract, represent relevant
issues in the PS de￿nition and its enforcement.
Finally, we ought to mention a limit of the present analysis: we do not
consider in this paper the well-known trade-o⁄generated by the introduction
of a PS rule between lowering extreme pro￿ts and dulling the ￿rm￿ s incentive
for cost reduction.12 This is because our model, though simple, focusses on
the essential features which characterize the regulator￿ s motivation and the
information setting for enforcing a PS rule, leaving the ￿rm the strategic
choice of compling with the PS rule or not complying.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents
10For an analysis of incentives to call for contract renewal from a bilateral perspective,
see Andersen and Christensen (2002).
11As discussed in La⁄ont and Tirole (1994, p.15), endogeneity of the regulatory lag -
which is in the essence of the most real-life adopted regulation mechanism - is especially
important when the incentive properties of regulation are investigated.
12In this respect the literature has mainly stressed that compulsory sharing of pro￿t
may: a) reduce the ￿rm￿ s incentive to minimize operating costs and increase revenue
(Lyon, 1996; Crew and Kleindorfer, 1996); b) provide an incentive to undertake projects
that are unduly risky (Blackmon, 1994); c) lead the utility to delay investment (Moretto
et al., 2003).
6the basic model in which a PS rule is introduced. Section 3, derives the regu-
lator￿ s value of the option to revoke the contract as well as the optimal pro￿t
threshold that triggers it (Proposition 1): when ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts are veri￿able,
this threshold indeed represents the optimal level at which to introduce the
PS rule (Proposition 2). Section 4 explores PS sustainability when the ￿rm￿ s
pro￿t is nonveri￿able (Proposition 3). Section 5 investigates the price ad-
justment which follows the introduction of a PS rule in a PCR setting, and
￿nally Section 6 concludes with some implications of the study for policy and
a suggestion of how the model could be extended.
2 The model
We consider a risk-neutral pro￿t-maximizing ￿rm managing a one-time sunk
indivisible project for the provision of a public utility under a long-term
franchise contract. We assume that no new investments13 are undertaken
during the contract period; this assumption emphasizes that the focus of
our analysis is on the ￿rm-regulator relationship in a regulatory framework
designed to cope with high pro￿ts, not with conduct that aims to conceal
high pro￿ts.
Moreover, we assume that the in￿nitely lived project produces a ￿ ow of
pro￿ts ￿t which evolves over time according to a geometric Brownian motion,
with instantaneous rate of growth ￿ > 0 and instananeous volatility ￿ ￿ 0 :
d￿t = ￿￿tdt + ￿￿tdWt; ￿0 = ￿ (1)
where dWt is the standard increment of a Wiener process, uncorrelated over
time and satisfying the conditions that E(dWt) = 0 and E(dW 2
t ) = dt:
Hence, under these assumptions the value of an in￿nite project, V (￿); can
be expressed by (Harrison, 1985, pag.44):










where ￿ > ￿ is the constant risk-free rate of interest14. As V is a multiple of
￿, it also is a geometric Brownian motion with the same parameters ￿ and
13Moretto et al. (2003) investigate endogenous investment in pro￿t-sharing regulation.
14Alternatively, we could use a discount rate that includes an appropriate adjustment
for risk and take the expectation with respect to a distribution for ￿ that is adjusted for
risk neutrality (see Cox and Ross, 1976; Harrison and Kreps, 1979).
7￿:
dVt = ￿Vtdt + ￿VtdWt; with V0 = V (3)
Although equation (2) is an abstraction from real projects, we can think
at ￿ as the "reduced form" of a more complex model where the instantaneous
cash ￿ ow ￿t = ￿(zt) depends on a vector of variables zt, which may include
the market price, the quality of the service, the ￿rm￿ s investments and market
shocks that account for some sources of uncertainty in consumer demand
and/or technological choice.
In our model, when the monopolist makes "huge" pro￿ts, the regulator
can introduce a PS rule to divert these "excess" pro￿ts to consumers, or
revoke the ￿rm￿ s contract to re-obtain responsability for managing the utility
and re-address the project￿ s pro￿tability. In what follows, we ￿rstly model
how the PS rule is designed and, in the next section, how the contract closure
is modelled.
Among the many ways of introducing PS, the simplest one is the setting
of an upper bound on pro￿ts by the regulator, ￿￿.15 In technical terms ￿￿ is
a re￿ ecting barrier, i.e. at ￿￿; a "pro￿t cut" stops ￿t from going above ￿￿.
To set up an appropriate mathematical model representing the above PS
rule we are guided by the theory of optimal barrier regulations (Harrison and
Taksar, 1983; Harrison, 1985). In addition, as from (2) choosing ￿￿ is equiva-
lent to choosing an upper limit to the value of the project V ￿, hereinafter we
take Vt as the primitive exogenous state variable for the regulatory process
we are considering. Thus, if the monopolist starts with the initial project￿ s
value V0 < V ￿, the regulator￿ s PS rule applies as follows:16
￿ for Vt < V ￿; let Vt evolve on its own and follow the geometric Brownian
motion (3);
￿ for Vt ￿ V ￿; introduce the PS rule drt to stop Vt from going above V ￿.
The new "regulated" process Vt ￿ rt can be described by the following
15For qualitatively analogous rules see Sappington and Weisman (1996).For a more
general discussion about pro￿t-sharing rule adopted in the recent experience of public
utility regulation see Sappington (2002)
16Really, this is a "value-sharing" rule: we call it PS as there is a one-to-one relationship
between the ￿rm￿ s value and pro￿ts. See Moretto and Valbonesi (2000) for the explicit
model of the production decision of the ￿rm.
8stochastic di⁄erential equation17:
dVt = ￿Vtdt + ￿VtdWt ￿ drt; V0 = V; for Vt 2 (0;V
￿] (4)
where the increment drt represents the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t reduction between
time t and t + dt.
The PS rule is then a process proportional to Vt, parametrized by the ini-
tial condition V ￿; right-continuous, non-decreasing and non-negative, de￿ned
as:
rt = a(V
￿)Vt if Vt ￿ V
￿; (5)





]; T ￿ = inf(t ￿ T ￿ j Vt ￿ V ￿ = 0+) and
rt = 0 for all t ￿ T ￿(see Appendix A). As shown in Figure 1 below, the
PS de￿ned in (5) increases to keep Vt lower than V ￿ and is given by the
cumulative amount of pro￿t control exerted on the sample path of Vt up to
t:18
Figure 1 - about here -
17Stochastic di⁄erential equations such as (5) are a notational convenience, since only
their integral counterparts are well de￿ned. The "impulse" dr must be interpreted as
potentially taking ￿nite values when a discrete jump occurs (Harrison and Taksar, 1983;
Harrison, 1985).
18It is worth noting that the above setup allows us to deal with more complex pro￿t-
sharing mechanisms. For example, suppose at V ￿ the regulator introduces a PS rule
de￿ned as a percentage cut of the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts: we can model this rule adding a new
stochastic di⁄erential equation for the pro￿t cut. That is:
dVt = ￿Vtdt + ￿VtdWt ￿ drt;
and
dMt = sdrt
where M is de￿ned by giving up 1=s unit of V for each unit of M: Threfore, above V ￿;
the PS rule can now be reformulated in terms of the new variable Yt = Vt=Mt: When the
existing combination of (Vt;Mt) places Yt above s; the regulator intervenes immediately
by cutting back on pro￿ts (drt > 0). The amount of pro￿ts cut is very small and is such
as to push the ￿rm￿ s value along a line of slope 1=s.
93 The optimal PS rule
In the previous section we have modelled the PS rule (5) for a given exoge-
nous upper bound value V ￿. We now need to de￿ne which value triggers
the regulator￿ s PS introduction as well as the regulator￿ s adoption of the
alternative strategy, the option to revoke the contract.
In this section we perfom our analysis under the simpler assumption of
the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t veri￿ability which - in this context - refers to the fact that
the pro￿t level can be proved in court: this implies that the regulator￿ s threat
of contract closure becomes binding for every ￿rm￿ s pro￿t level higher than
the optimal trigger.
We assume the regulator minimizes an intertemporal social welfare loss
function which is an increasing function of the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t: indeed, an in-
crease in the monopolist￿ s pro￿ts reduces the monetary value of consumer
welfare. In this perspective, if the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts becomes too high, that is, if
the social welfare loss is too large, the regulator adopts one of the following
alternative and equivalent strategies:
1. introducing a PS rule - de￿ned as (5) - to divert pro￿ts from the ￿rm
to consumers;
2. revoking the contract and re-determiing provision, thus re-addressing
the project￿ s pro￿tability.
Contract closure is then an "outside" option the regulator can always
exercise. We model this option as a perpetual call option, with the project￿ s
value V as the underlying asset: thus, by considering a social welfare loss
function, the regulator revokes the contract if V exceeds a critical threshold
V ￿￿.
In this section we prove that (5) is - under the assumption of pro￿t veri￿-
ability - optimally determined by ￿xing V ￿ = V ￿￿, which makes the regulator
indi⁄erent between revoking the contract and applying the PS rule. We ob-
tain this result by ￿rstly determining the value V ￿￿ that triggers revocation
(Proposition 1), and then showing that V ￿￿ is indeed the regulator￿ s optimal
trigger to introduce the PS rule (5) (Proposition 2).
103.1 Social welfare and the option to revoke
The regulator￿ s intertemporal loss function when the contract is revoked at
time T is:19
L(VT;V0) + (I ￿ VT) (6)
where L(VT;V0) is the consumers￿welfare reduction up to the revocation
time T; V0 is the value of the project at time zero, and LV(VT;V0) > 0;
L(V0;V0) ￿ 0: The term I ￿ VT is the regulator￿ s (net) cost of revocation.
Indeed, revocation is costly as the contract closure determines that the man-
agement of the project is back in the regulator￿ s hands and this implies that
the regulator should implement the new utility provision (i.e.: through direct
management, privatization or contracting out to another ￿rm). Speci￿cally,
this cost of revocation captures the regulator￿ s cost in ￿nding for a new fran-
chisee, or - in the case of direct provision of the service - in training and
hiring new personnel and/or adopting new technologies, or legal expenditure
if the ￿rm decides to sue the regulator, or, more generally, any cost belonging
from regulatory capture from the ￿rm.20
Since minimizing (6) is equivalent to maximizing VT ￿ I ￿ L(VT;V0),
it is evident that rent extraction can be part of the regulator￿ s objective in
revoking the contract.21 Exercising the option to revoke requires the payment
of the sunk cost I plus the social cost L(VT;V0). By the sunkness of I; it is
never optimal to revoke when VT ￿I ￿L(VT;V0) is equal to zero, that is, for
the regulator, it is better to wait until the value reaches a higher level.
Among the many possible ways of modelling the social welfare loss, we
adopt a utilitarian criterion and approximate L(VT;V0) as ￿(VT ￿V0), where
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 can be interpreted as the ￿scal distortion in raising public funds
if the service has to be run in-house.22 De￿ning F(V ) as the value of the
19Our results will still hold if the regulator￿ s preference also takes into account ￿rm￿ s
value, but give it less weight than public funds.
20For a discussion about the di⁄erent sources of regulatory capture from the ￿rm, see
La⁄ont and Tirole (1994, chapter 11).
21See Crew and Kleindorfer (1996, p. 218), for a discussion on rent extraction as included
in the regulator￿ s objective function.
22According to the utilitarian criterion we can approximate the welfare function at time
T by the weighted and discounted average of the net surplus of consumers K ￿(1+￿)VT
and the value of the project VT. Hence, the social welfare loss is simply given by:
L(VT) ￿ K ￿ ￿V0 ￿ [K ￿ ￿VT] = ￿(VT ￿ V0)
11option at t = 0, we get:




(VT ￿ I ￿ L(VT))e







(1 ￿ ￿)VT ￿ ^ I)e
￿￿T j V0 = V
i
where T(V ￿￿) = inf (t ￿ 0 j Vt ￿ V ￿￿ = 0+) is the unknown future time when
the option is exercised, V ￿￿ is the threshold value that triggers that action
and ^ I ￿ I ￿￿V0 is the exercise price. The optimization is subject to (3) and
V0
23.
Note that F(V ) is a perpetual call option. By using standard results in
the (real) option valuation (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), the solution of (7) is
given by:






A(V ￿￿)V ￿ for all V < V ￿￿




















1￿￿ > 0 (10)
Proof. see Appendix B
Hence, the regulator￿ s optimal revocation rule can be expressed as: ￿Revoke
the contract as soon as the value of the project exceeds the adjusted
break-even value V ￿￿￿ .
Inspection of the opportunity cost ￿ in (9) reveals that:
where K is the expected value of the consumers￿willingness to pay for the service (La⁄ont
and Tirole, 1994).
23Moreover, for a consistent optimal revocation, we must also assume that ^ I > 0 and
V ￿￿ ￿ ^ I > 0.
24￿ > 1 is the positive root of the quadratic equation: ￿(￿) = 1
2￿2￿(￿￿1)+￿￿￿￿ = 0
12￿ as ￿ ! 0; i.e. the regulator becomes socially ￿indi⁄erent￿between the
direct management of the utility and the franchising contract to a ￿rm,
V ￿￿ drops to
￿
￿￿1I and the probability of revocation increases.
￿ as ￿ ! 1, i.e. the opportunity cost of direct management by the
regulator rises, V ￿￿ ! 1 and the regulator never revokes.



















Maximizing (7) means maximizing the expected discounted value of the








￿￿ < 1 is the expected discount factor. Then, maximizing
(11) with respect to V ￿￿ gives the optimal revocation trigger as in (9).
3.2 Revocation vs Pro￿t-Sharing
Since for Vt > V ￿￿ it is optimal for the regulator to revoke the contract
to minimize social welfare loss, in this section we demonstrate that V ￿￿ is
indeed the optimal re￿ ecting barrier for the regulator￿ s introduction of the
PS mechanism (5). That is, by setting V ￿ = V ￿￿, the regulator is indi⁄erent
between applying the PS rule and revoking the contract.
First, we ￿nd the regulator￿ s welfare loss function when the PS has been
adopted. Denoting the expected value of future cumulative pro￿t reduction
due to (5) by R(VT;V ￿); the regulator￿ s loss function at T becomes:
￿(VT ￿ V0) + (I ￿ VT) + (1 ￿ ￿)R(VT;V
￿) (12)
where V ￿ is a generic re￿ ecting barrier. Next, the value of the regulator￿ s
option to revoke (7) at zero is now:
F






(1 ￿ ￿)VT ￿ ^ I ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)R(VT;V
￿))e
￿￿T j V0 = V
i
(13)
where the superscripts refer to the PS rule (5) and the optimization is subject
to (4) and V0. Solution of (13) shows that:
13Proposition 2 i) The regulator￿ s optimal revocation trigger once the PS is








ii) If V ￿ = V ￿￿; the PS rule (5) keeps the regulator indi⁄erent to revoca-
tion, i.e.:
F
r(Vt) = 0 for t ￿ 0 (15)
Proof. see Appendix C
Proposition 2 ascertains the optimality of the sharing rule (5) with re-
spect to the regulator￿ s alternative equivalent strategy, that is, the optimal
regulator￿ s contract closure: if the ￿rm keeps pro￿ts below V ￿￿; revocation
is never optimal.
Proposition 2 provides further considerations. First, the optimal revoca-
tion trigger under PS is equal to the optimal revocation trigger without PS
as in (9). This is just an application of the dynamic programming principle
of optimality: if at t = 0 the regulator sets V ￿￿ as the optimal revocation
trigger, this should be optimal for any t > 0; independently of any future
policy after V ￿￿.
Second, if the regulator sets V ￿ = V ￿￿ as a re￿ ecting barrier, the value of
its option to revoke is always equal to zero. The intuition behind this relevant
result is a straightforward implication of the barrier control rt applied to the
process Vt: Indeed, the true cost of exercising the option for the regulator is
not just equal to the strike price ^ I, but also includes the future pro￿t cuts
R(Vt;V ￿) and the value of the forgone option F r(Vt). Thus, the net expected



























pendix C). Maximizing (16) with respect to V ￿ gives:
￿
F r(V ￿)
V ￿ ￿ F
r0(V
￿) = 0 (17)
Since to avoid arbitrage at V ￿ the second term of (17) must be equal to
14zero, we get (15).25 That is, from (16), the regulator is indi⁄erent between
introducing the PS rule and revoking the contract when the expected bene￿ts
from pro￿t regulation exactly o⁄set the expected social welfare loss due to
the monopolist￿ s excess pro￿ts.
Finally, although the PS rule (5) is simply proportional to the project￿ s
value, several novel implications follow:
￿ rt is parametrized by the initial condition V ￿ which, in turn, depends
on the revocation cost I and on the opportunity cost parameter ￿: An
increase in I and ￿ decreases rt:
￿ rt is non-decreasing and is given by the cumulative amount of pro￿t
cuts exerted on the sample path of Vt up to t: Thus, rt relates to past
realizations of Vt, which makes the PS time-dependent.
4 E¢ ciency of the PS
An important facet of the PS rule - analysed in the previous sections - is
its dynamic sustainability when the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t are observable, but nonver-
i￿able. In this case, the regulator cannot force the ￿rm to cut "excessive"
pro￿ts as "no court or other third party will accept to arbitrate a claim based
on the value taken by these variables" (SalaniØ, 1997, p.177). Then, given
the assumption of pro￿t￿ s non-veri￿ability, is still the regulator￿ s threat of
contract closure in itself su¢ cient to induce the ￿rm to comply with (5) as
Vt intersects V ￿? In this section we formally demonstrate that the proposed
PS rule sustains a perfect equilibrium for the repeated continuous time reg-
ulatory relationship that starts at T ￿: we do this by showing that any ￿rm￿ s
deviation from (5) makes contract closure worthwhile for the regulator. In
addition, since Vt is a Markov process, it is easy to ascertain that the equi-
librium is also sub-game perfect.
25The function Fr(Vt) is de￿ned as the expected value of the regulator￿ s net bene￿t when
the utility is expropriated at time T: As the net bene￿t is a continuous function of the
primitive process Vt, also Fr is a continuous function except perhaps when Vt = V ￿ and
the pro￿t sharing rule rt is applied. The behavior around Vt = V ￿ is given by expanding
Fr(Vt) as:
Fr(V ￿) = Fr(V ￿ ￿ dr) = Fr(V ￿) ￿ Fr0(V ￿)dr
which yields Fr0(V ￿) = 0 : This condition holds at any re￿ ecting barrier without any
optimization being involved (Dixit, 1993).
15The regulatory game we consider here lasts a possibly in￿nite26 number
of periods, and ends once the regulator exercises the option to revoke the
franchise contract. Each period is divided in four stages: at the ￿rst stage,
the regulated monopolist is delegated to manage the supply of a public utility
and nature chooses a parameter determining the pro￿t of the ￿rm. At the
second stage, after having observing the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t, the regulator decides
whether or not to ask for a PS: if the regulator perceives that the monop-
olist is making "excessively" high pro￿ts, he sets a pro￿t ceiling, say V ￿,
according to (9), above which the PS rule (5) applies; the regulator accom-
panies its announcement with a threat to revoke the contract if the ￿rm does
not comply.27. At the third stage, the monopolist decides whether or not
to comply with the regulator￿ s prescription (i.e.: that is, whether or not to
start with stream of payment rt ￿ 0)28. At the fourth stage, the regulator,
conditional on the price sets by the monopolist, decides whether or not to
revoke the contract. If the regulator does revoke, the monopolist su⁄ers the
loss Vt and the regulator obtains Vt ￿ I (i.e.: the net gain from revocation).
If the regulator does not revoke, the game goes ahead to the next period and
it is repeated.
However, without a binding commitment by the regulator, any ￿nite num-
ber of ￿rm pro￿t reductions will be ine¢ cient. In fact, the regulator￿ s prob-
lem is that for any t ￿ T ￿ he has an incentive to carry out his threat, even
if the monopolist reduces its pro￿ts. Since this means that the monopolist
will not ward o⁄ the threat by reducing its pro￿ts, the monopolist will not
reduce them. Thus, the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium is ine¢ cient:
revocation is carried out regardless of the monopolist￿ s positive net present
value. To avoid this ine¢ ciency the ￿rm must continuously "control" its
pro￿ts; that is, for t ￿ T ￿, the monopolist should consider V ￿ as the ceiling
not to be crossed, and reduce its expected pro￿ts just enough to keep Vt <
V ￿ to prevent contract closure:29 To summarize:
26Owing to uncertainty, neither ￿rm nor regulator can perfectly predict Vt each time.
As Vt follows a random walk, for each time interval dt there is a constant probability of
moving up or down. Therefore, the game ends in ￿nite (stochastic) time with probability
one, but everything proceeds as if the horizon were in￿nite.
27By the Markov Property of (22), in our model it is not important when the regulator
announces V ￿ as long as it is between zero and T￿.
28In our in￿nite-lived project without investment, the ￿rm￿ s dominant strategy is not
to make the payment rt ￿ 0, that is not to comply.
29There are many e¢ cient sub-game perfect equilibria where the threat of revocation
induces an in￿nite ￿ ow of payments by the ￿rm to prevent contract closure (see Shavell
16Proposition 3 The following strategy represents a sub-game perfect equilib-
rium:
i) As long as Vt < V ￿ nothing is done. As soon as Vt crosses V ￿ from
below, the monopolist reduces its pro￿ts by (5) and the regulator does not
revoke.
ii) Pro￿t regulation ends in ￿nite (stochastic) time with probability one.
Proof. see Appendix D
As both the players expect an in￿nite repetition of their relationship,
their choices in each period will depend on the previous moves. The players￿
strategy for each period t ￿ T ￿ can be described as follows: the monopolist
observes Vt and chooses to impose a pro￿t reduction rt or not; the regulator
￿Does not Revoke￿if the ￿rm has followed the rule rt to keep Vt < V ￿ for all
t0 < t30. On the contrary, the regulator ￿Revokes￿if the ￿rm has deviated
from rt at any t0 < t:
Our stochastic-continuous time framework calls for an instantaneous re-
ply by the regulator when the monopolist departs from the PS rule (5), that
is, the regulator adopts the most severe punishment: revocation.31 The reg-
ulator believes that this mechanism, from the initial date and state (T ￿;V ￿);
will be retained for the whole (stochastic) planning horizon. Since the project
we model here is in￿nitely-lived, the present value of forgone pro￿ts will in-
deed always ensure participation by the ￿rm, and the expectation of future
pro￿t regulations keeps the regulator from carrying out his threat.32
Finally, the second part of the Proposition 3 says that with probability
one the pro￿t regulation ends in the (stochastic) ￿nite interval. Intuitively,
although the ￿rm prefers to cut pro￿ts rather than terminate the contract
(i.e. the loss from closure is greater than the expected pro￿t cuts), it always
and Spier, 1996, Proposition 2).
30In our continuous time setting we assume, without any loss of generality, that when
the regulator is indi⁄erent between revoking the contract and not revoking, he does not
exercise the option.
31In continuous time repeated games there is no notion of last time before t, so induction
cannot be applied. For examples on how to represent continuous time as a sequence of
discrete-time grids that becomes in￿nitely negligible, we refer the reader to Simon and
Stinchcombe (1989) and Bergin and MacLeod (1993).
32Considering a long-term, but ￿nite, franchise contract, the ￿rm￿ s opportunistic be-
haviour in the last period of the contract should be taken into account: in this case, the
￿rm￿ s incentive into comply with the regulator￿ s PS prescription are di⁄erent from that
we have modelled here.
17prefers to stop payment if the threat of revocation is not carried out. The
￿rm "regulates" pro￿ts until Vt ￿ V ￿according to rt; but when Vt reaches,
for the ￿rst time after T ￿; the trigger V ￿ again, it ceases regulation. That
is, at T 0￿ = inf(t ￿ T ￿ j Vt ￿V ￿ = 0￿), if the ￿rm sets rT0 = 0, the regulator
will face a jump from zero to F(V ￿) but revocation is not carried out (See
Figure 1). The game then starts afresh.
5 PCR and dynamic price adjustment
Let￿ s conclude showing how the above PS rule can be implemented in a PCR
setting. To do this we introduce a reduced form for the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t function
(1) that depends only on the price of the service and a demand shock, i.e.
zt = (pt;￿t) . That is, we assume that:





with " 2 (0;1):
2. The random parameter ￿t follows a trendless, geometric Brownian mo-
tion, with instantaneous volatility ￿ > 0; i.e.:
d￿t = ￿￿tdWt; with ￿0 = ￿ (19)
where dWt is the standard increment of a Wiener process33.
3. No operating costs are present but there is a per period ￿xed cost c34.
Then, the monopolist￿ s project gives a pro￿t ￿ ow at each time t equal
to35:
￿(pt;￿t) = v(pt;￿t) ￿ c ￿ p
1￿"
t ￿t ￿ c: (20)
33By the Markov Property of (19), the quality of all subsequent results does not change
if we assume a trend for demand to increase.
34The ￿xed costs we consider here are, as standard in the literature, ￿ ow ￿xed costs
of production: that is, we assume that the ￿rm begins the ￿rst period endowed with a
technology whose operation entails a ￿ ow cost c per unit of time.
35We avoid, for simplicity, considering operating options such as reducing output or even
shutting down that incresaes the value of the ￿rm (MacDonald and Siegel, 1986; Dixit and
Pindyck,1994, chs. 6 and 7).
184. The monopolist is subject to price regulation. The price p is allowed to
increase by the di⁄erence between expected in￿ ation (the Retail Price
Index, RPI) and an exogenously given expected increase in productiv-
ity over time (x):
dpt = (RPI ￿ x)ptdt; with p0 = p (21)
These assumptions enable us to reduce the model to one dimension. Ex-
panding d￿(pt;￿t) and applying the It￿￿ s lemma it is easy to show that
v(pt;￿t) is driven by the following geometric Brownian motion:
dvt = ￿vtdt + ￿vtdWt with v0 = v; (22)
with:
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ")(RPI ￿ x)
The drift parameter of the process vt is a linear combination of the corre-
sponding parameters of the primitive process ￿t and of the price-cap rule (21).
Finally, since the monopolist is risk-neutral, using the simpli￿ed expression








As far as the price-cap revision is concerned, in the event of the ￿rm￿ s
pro￿ts going beyond a "pre-determined" level, the PS rule requires the x
factor to be automatically adjusted upward, making the price-cap adjustment
rate RPI ￿x more stringent (Sappington, 2002). According to this practice
we can rewrite (4) as:
dVt = (1 ￿ ")(RPI ￿ x
0)Vtdt + ￿VtdWt; V0 = V; for V 2 (0;V
￿] (24)






(V ￿=Vv) > x is the new price decrease factor which
stops the process Vt from going any higher than V ￿: How the x0 factor works
seems intuitively appealing. As the numerical value for V ￿ is known, by (23)









￿^ I); from which the boundary value for ￿














19For any given value of the price pt; random ￿ uctuations of ￿t move the
point (￿t;pt) horizontally left or right. If the point goes to the right of the
boundary, then a price reduction is made immediately shifting the point
down to the boundary. If ￿t stays to the left of the boundary, no new price
reduction is applied. Thus, price reduction proceeds gradually to maintain
(25) the equality. To illustrate, suppose RPI ￿ x = 0 so that pt = p0 for
all t; by inverting (25) we obtain the optimal boundary function p(￿t) which












Futhermore, higher costs shift the boundary (25) to the right, ￿
0￿ > ￿
￿
and determine ￿rm￿ s smaller price reduction to comply with the PS rule36.
The boundary function for this case is shown in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2 - about here -
6 Final Remarks
In this paper we employ a real options approach to investigate the properties
of a second-best optimal pro￿t-sharing (PS) mechanism imposed by a welfare-
maximising regulator. We consider a dynamic setting where a regulated
monopolist is delegated to manage a long-term franchise contract to supply a
public utility. If the monopolist￿ s pro￿t becomes "excessively" high, that is, if
the social welfare loss is too large, we have assumed that the regulator always
has the possibility to adopt one of the following alternative and equivalent
strategies:
- introducing a PS mechanism to divert pro￿ts from the ￿rm to consumers;
- revoking the contract and re-determing provision, thus re-addressing the
project￿ s pro￿tability.
Speci￿cally, we have modelled the regulator￿ s option to revoke as a per-
petual call option which is a function of the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts, social welfare and
the regulator￿ s cost of revocation.
36As matter of fact, cost padding by the franchisee is another strategy that might be
used to avoid the appearance of excess pro￿t. It would be possible to model the franchisee
as reporting costs and the regulator as employing auditors to determine the accuracy of
cost reports, but this is not our topic here.
20Under the assumption of veri￿ability of pro￿ts, we have endogenously
determined the pro￿t threshold that triggers revocation (Proposition 1) and
proved that this threshold keeps the regulator indi⁄erent between revoking
the contract and applying the PS rule (Proposition 2). We formally show
that in the unique equilibrium of the game the monopolist will always comply
with the regulator￿ s PS rule and the contract closure will never occur; the
regulator will impose the PS rule whenever the pro￿t is higher than the
identi￿ed trigger level.
Under the more realistic assumption of pro￿t￿ s non-veri￿ability, we have
then investigated the dynamic sustainaibility of the PS clause. We formally
proved that - for all the pro￿t levels higher that the pro￿t threshold which
makes the regulator indi⁄erent between contract closure and imposing the
PS - it is sequentially optimal for the regulator to revoke the contract: that
is, we showed that any ￿rm￿ s deviation from the PS rule makes revocation
worthwhile for the regulator. Hence, the perfect equilibrium of the game with
pro￿ts non-veri￿ability is also such that the monopolist complies with the
PS rule chosen by the regulator in each period, as long as the revocation has
not been carried out (Proposition 3). The price adjustment which follows
results thus endogenously and dynamically determined as the monopolist￿ s
best response to the regulator￿ s choice.
We have also showed that as the regulator￿ s contract closure can be very
costly - i.e. it could imply costs belonging from any form of capture of the
regulator by the ￿rm - a considerable regulatory lag can occur before a PS
rule is introduced: the higher the revocation cost, the lower the pro￿t shared
and the less frequent the regulator￿ s PS prescription. This conclusion sug-
gests a theoretical reason why the PS mechanism in its dynamic application
would tend to be unsuccessful in the real world: speci￿cally, as long as the
regulator￿ s threat to revoke the contract becomes not credible, the regulated
￿rm is no longer rewarded for comply with the adopted PS rule.
Finally, introducing a reduced form of the ￿rm pro￿t function, we have
provided the x factor adjustment in a price-cap regulation setting: this appli-
cation illustrates how the parameters which characterize the pro￿t function
a⁄ect the PS e⁄ectiveness.
To close, let us brie￿ y suggest a possible extension of our analysis which
recalls the main symplifying assumption we adopted in the paper. The eco-
nomic literature on PS regulation generally holds that pro￿t-sharing rules re-
duce the ￿rm￿ s incentive to invest (Lyon, 1996; Crew and Kleindorfer, 1996;
Sappington, 2002; Moretto et al., 2003). In contrast with this literature,
21our analysis - which address speci￿cally the unilateral regulator￿ s bargaining
position in the regulatory contract - has been carried out under the assump-
tion of no ￿rm investment. Thus, a natural extention of our model could
include the ￿rm￿ s choice of investment - both irreversible and reversible - to
assess the e⁄ects of contract closure by the regulator on such ￿rm￿ s strategic
decision.
22Appendix
A. The regulation mechanism
We de￿ne the regulation which follows the introduction of the PS rule as the reduction
dVt needed to keep Vt at V ￿: This is represented by a one-sided non-decreasing adapted
control process (as in Harrison, 1985) on the state variable V which is right-continuous
and non-negative. Then, the control policy consists of a process Z = fZt;t ￿ 0g and a
regulated process V r = fV r
t ;t ￿ 0g such that:
V
r





￿ i) Vt is a geometric Brownian motion, with stochastic di⁄erential as in (3);
￿ ii) Zt is a decreasing and continuous process with respect to Vt ;
￿ iii) Z0 = 1 if V0 ￿ V ￿; and Z0 = V ￿=V0 if V0 > V ￿ so that V r
0 = V ￿;
￿ iv) Zt decreases only when V r
t = V ￿.





t dt + ￿V
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Zt ￿ VtdZt = ￿drt is the in￿nitesimal level of value forgone by the ￿rm. In
terms of the regulated process V r
t , we can write:
rt ￿ r(Vt) = Vt ￿ V
r
t ￿ (1 ￿ Zt)Vt; (28)
Although the process Zt may have a jump at time t = 0; it is continuous and keeps
Vt below the barrier V ￿ exercising the minimum amount of control: in fact, control is
exercised only when Vt crosses V ￿ from below with a probability one in the absence of
regulation. Therefore, in the case of V0 < V ￿; we get V r
t ￿ Vt; with the initial condition
V r
0 ￿ V0 = V; and Zt = 1:
At T ￿ ￿ T(V ￿) = inf(t ￿ 0 j Vt ￿ V ￿ = 0+) control starts so as to maintain
V r
t = V ￿:
23The ￿rm￿ s values are adjusted downward by the amount rt = Vt￿V r
t ￿ 0 every time
V ￿ is hit. The same conditions (i)￿(iv) uniquely determine Zt with the representation
form (Harrison,1985; Proposition 3, p. 19-20):37
Zt ￿
(
min(1;V ￿=V0) for t = 0
inf
0￿v￿t
(V ￿=Vv) for t ￿ 0 (29)
B. Proof of Proposition 1
The function F(Vt) is de￿ned as the expected value at time t of the regulator￿ s net
bene￿t when the utility is expropriated at time T: As the net bene￿t is a continuous
function of the primitive process Vt , also F is a continuous function of Vt. Then, by a
short arbitrage argument (Cox and Ross, 1976; Harrison and Kreps, 1979), applying Ito￿ s
lemma to F, the value of the regulator￿ s option to revoke becomes the solution of the








0(Vt) ￿ ￿F(Vt) = 0; for Vt 2 (0;V
￿￿]; (30)
where F(Vt) must satisfy the following boundary conditions:
lim
Vt!0
F(V t) = 0 (31)
F(V




￿￿) = 1 ￿ ￿ (33)
If the value of the utility goes to zero, so does the option. Conditions (32) and (33)
imply respectively that, at the trigger level V ￿￿, the value of the option is equal to its
liabilities where ^ I indicates the sunk cost of revocation (matching value condition) and
suboptimal exercise of the option is ruled out (smooth pasting condition). By the linearity




37This is an application of a well-known result of Levy (1948), for which the process:
lnV r
t ￿ lnVt + lnZt ￿ lnVt ￿ inf
0￿v￿t
(lnVv ￿ lnV ￿)
has the same distribution as the ￿re￿ ected Brownian process￿j lnVt ￿ lnV ￿ j :






2￿(￿ ￿ 1) + ￿￿ ￿ ￿ = 0 (35)
As (34) represents the option value of optimally revoking the contract, the constant
A must be positive and the solution is valid over the range of Vt for which it is optimal























1￿￿ > 0: (37)
This concludes the proof.
C. Proof of Proposition 2
We prove that when the regulator uses (28), its option to revoke is always equal to
zero.
Cost of regulation
Let￿ s denote by R(V r
t ;V ￿) the expected value of future cumulative pro￿t cuts. At






















0 ￿ V0 2 (0;V
￿]
￿
where V ￿ is the (generic) upper re￿ ecting barrier de￿ned in (27). Since V r
t is a Markov
process in levels (Harrison, 1985, Proposition 7, p. 80-81), we know that the foregoing
conditional expectation is in fact a function of the starting state alone.38 Keeping the
38For V0 = V > V ￿ optimal control would require Z to have a jump at zero so as to
ensure V r
0 = V ￿: In this case the integral on the right of (38) is de￿ned to include the
control cost r0 incurred at t = 0; that is (see Harrison 1985, p. 102-103):
Z 1
0




where r0 = V ￿ V r
0 :
25dependence of R on V r
t active and assuming that it is twice continuously di⁄erentiable,
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where it has been taken into account that for a ￿nite-variation process likeZt; (dZt)2 = 0:
As dZt = 0 except when V r































This is a stochastic di⁄erential equation in R: Integrating by part the process Re￿rt we




















































Taking the expectation of (41) and letting t ! 1; if the following conditions apply:
(a) lim
l!0
Pr[T(l) < T(V ￿) j V0 2 (0;V ￿]] = 0 for l ￿ V r
t < V ￿ < 1; where
T(l) = inf(t ￿ 0 j V r
t = l) and T(V ￿) = inf(t ￿ 0 j V r
t = V ￿);
26(b) R(V r
t ;V ￿)) is bounded within (0;V ￿];
(c) e￿￿tV r
t R0(V r







t ;V ￿) + ￿V r
t R0(V r
t ;V ￿) ￿ ￿R(V r
t ;V ￿) = 0;
we obtain R(V r;V ￿) as indicated in (38). Condition (a) says that the probability of the
regulated process V r
t reaching zero before reaching another point within the set (0;V ￿]
is zero. As V r
t is a geometric type of process this condition is, in general, always satis￿ed
(Karlin and Taylor, 1981, p. 228-230). Furthermore, if condition (a) holds and R(V r;V ￿)
is bounded, then conditions (b) and (c) also hold. According to the linearity of (e) and












1￿￿ > 0 (43)
As for V0 ￿ V ￿; Z0 = 1 and V r
0 ￿ V0 = V; then R(V0;V ￿) = R(V ;V ￿): On the
other hand, if V0 > V ￿; we get Z0 = V ￿=V0; so that V r
0 = V ￿ and R(V r
0 ;V ￿) =
R(V ￿;V ￿):
The value of revocation under pro￿t control
Indicating by F r(V ) the regulator￿ s value of the option under pro￿ts control, this can








((1 ￿ ￿)VT ￿ ^ I ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)B(V
￿)VT
￿)e
￿￿T j V0 = V
i
(44)
As in (34) this takes the form:
F
r(V ) = AV
￿
If the regulator decides for revocation, the optimal threshold, say V ￿￿; must satisfy
the two familiar conditions:
A(V
￿￿)
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)V










These two equations can be solved for the trigger V ￿￿ and for the constant A: Simple








and the constant A is equal to:




















Therefore setting V ￿￿ = V ￿ the constant A = 0 and the option value is identically
equal to zero.
Finally, as rt depends only on the primitive exogenous process Vt; the ￿regulated￿
process Vt ￿ rt is also a Markov process in levels (Harrison, 1985, Proposition 7, p. 80-
81). Thus, any option value beginning at a point t at which revocation has not taken
place has the same solution. This concludes the proof of Proposition 2.
D. Proof of Proposition 3
We prove that the regulatory scheme proposed in Proposition 2 is also optimal when
the regulator cannot force the ￿rm to adopt it. We proceed in the following way. First,
since by Proposition 2 the sharing rule rt makes the regulator￿ s option to revoke the
contract always equal to zero, it is also a good candidate for supporting a long-run equi-
librium of the threat-game. Next, we prove that this is indeed the case by applying a sort
of one-stage-deviation principle and showing that any deviation from rt makes revocation
worthwhile (the non-decreasing property of rt is crucial to this result). Finally, the Markov
property of the "regulated" process Vt ￿ rr makes the equilibrium sub-game perfect.
Revocation strategy and perfect equilibrium
It is well known that in￿nitely repeated games may be equivalent to repeated games
that terminate in ￿nite time. At each period there is a probability that the game continues
one more period. The key is that the conditional probability of continuing must be positive
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p. 148). This is indeed our case, neither player can perfectly
predict Vt at any date and the sharing rule (28) with form (29) is viewed by both agents
28as a stationary strategy for evaluating all future pro￿t reductions.39 In the strategy space
of the regulator it appears as:
￿(Vt;rt) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
Do not revoke at t = T ￿ if the ￿rm
plays the rule rt = (1 ￿ Zt)Vt for t0 < t
Revoke if the ￿rm deviates from
rt = (1 ￿ Zt)Vt at any t0 < t
where ￿(Vt;rt) is the strategy at t with history (Vt;Zt). The regulator￿ s ￿threat￿
strategy is chosen if the ￿rm deviates by adjusting Vt less than rt or by abandoning
rt = (1 ￿ Zt)Vt as a rule to evaluate future adjustments. The regulator must believe
that the regulation, from the initial date and state (T ￿;V ￿); will be kept in use for the
whole (stochastic) planning horizon. If the ￿rm deviates, the regulator believes that the
￿rm intends to switch to a di⁄erent rule in the future and knows for sure that the regulator
will revoke immediately thereafter. The regulator does not revoke att ifrt0 ￿ Vt0￿V r
t0 for
39Integrating the di⁄erential form (3), the geometric Brownian motion can be expressed
as:
Vt+dt = VtedYt
where dYt = ￿dt+￿dWt and ￿ = ￿￿ 1
2￿2:The di⁄erential dYt is derived as the continuous
limit of a discrete-time random walk, where in each small time interval of length ￿t the
variable y either moves up or down by ￿h with probabilities (Cox and Miller, 1965, p.
205-206):




















or de￿ning ￿h = ￿
p
￿t:
















That is, for small ￿t; ￿h is of order of magnitude O(
p




￿t);i.e. not very di⁄erent from 1
2: Furthermore, considering again the discrete-
time approximation of the process Yt; starting at V ￿e+￿h; the conditional probability of
reaching V ￿ is given by (Cox and Miller, 1965, ch.2):
Pr(Yt = 0 j Yt = 0 + ￿h) =
￿
1 if ￿ ￿ 0
e￿2￿￿h=￿
2
if ￿ > 0
which converges to one as ￿h tends to zero.
29all t0 ￿ t; because pro￿t cuts are expected to continue with the same rule and F r(V ) = 0
for all t ￿ T ￿. If rt0 < Vt0 ￿ V r
t0 for some t0 < t the regulator expects a di⁄erent rule
and carries out the threat, switching from F r(Vt) = 0 to F(Vt) ￿ V ￿ ￿ I: The game
is over. To prove this, we ￿rst need to prove the following Lemma:
Lemma 4 For each t0 > T ￿ we get:
R(Vt0;V






















Taking the expectations of both sides and using the zero-expectation property of the


















By the Strong Markov property ofV r
t



















Since ￿Vt0Zt0 + (￿ ￿ ￿)Er
t0
R 1
t0 e￿￿(s￿t0)Vsds = 0; substituting (38) and rearranging
we get:
R(Vt0;V







We now prove that rt is sub-game perfect by showing that the ￿rm cannot gain
by deviating from rt in an arbitrarily short interval and conforming to rt thereafter. In
40The Strong Markov Property of regulated Brownian motion processes stresses the
fact that the stochastic ￿rst passage time t and the stochastic process V r
t are independent
(Harrison, 1985, Proposition 7, p. 80-81).
30particular, let us assume (t0;t) an interval in which rs is kept ￿ at at rt0 so that V r
s ￿ V ￿;
and t is the ￿rst time in which dZt > 0.
Considering the decomposition (49) we can write (47) as:
R(Vt0;V





































where we have de￿ned V r￿
s = V r
t+s and r￿
s = rt+s ￿ rt for t0 ￿ t: Applying, again, the




















































where the second equality follows from the assumption that rs = rt0 ￿ Vt0 ￿ V r
t0 for all
s 2 (t0;t): Finally, noting that e￿￿(t￿t0) ’ 1￿￿(t￿t0) and
R t
t0 e￿￿(s￿t0)ds ’ (t￿t0)











From (50), any application of controls rt0 < Vt0 ￿ V r
t0 leads to a reduction of (47)
for all t ￿ t0 and, then, by Proposition 2, to F r(Vt;V ￿) > 0 which triggers revocation
by the regulator.
Furthermore, the ￿rm does not adjust by more than rt since doing so would not
increase the probability of delaying revocation. It does not pay less, since rt < Vt ￿ V r
t
induces closure making it worse o⁄, i.e. 0 < Vt:
Finally, as V r
t ￿ Vt ￿ rr is a Markov process in levels, it is clear from (47) that any
sub-game that begins at a point at which revocation has not taken place is equivalent to
the whole game. The strategy ￿ is e¢ cient for any sub-game starting at an intermediate
date and state (t;Vt). This concludes the ￿rst part of the Proposition.
Non-decreasing path of rt within [T ￿;T 0￿):
31So far we have implicitly assumed that, once started at T ￿; the pro￿t-sharing goes on
forever: Earlier interruptions are not feasible as long as the threat of revocation is credible.
Credibility relies on the fact that the agency￿ s option to revoke if the ￿rm deviates from
rt is always worth exercising at Vt > V ￿: However, in a Brownian path there is a positive
probability of the primitive process Vt crossing V ￿ again starting at an interior point of
the range (V ￿;1): In this case, the ￿rm may be willing to stop cutting pro￿ts. That
is, the ￿rm "regulates" pro￿ts until Vt ￿ V ￿according to rt; but when Vt reaches, for
the ￿rst time after T ￿; a predetermined level, say V 0 ￿ V ￿; it ceases regulation. The
regulator will then face a jump from zero to F(V 0) ￿ F(V ￿) making the threat of
revocation no longer credible.
To see how this happens let￿ s assume that the ￿rm stops adjusting pro￿ts at time T 0
with T ￿ < T
0 < 1; and T 0 = inf(t ￿ T ￿ j Vt ￿ V 0 and V 0 ￿ V ￿); i.e. T 0 is
the ￿rst time that the primitive process Vt reaches V 0 ￿ V ￿ with pro￿t regulation under
way. Then the value of the revocation option starting at any t 2 [T ￿;1) with t < T
0















where P(V 0;Vt) is the probability of the primitive process Vt reaching V 0 ￿ V ￿ starting
at an interior point of the range (V ￿;1); which is equal to (Cox and Miller, 1965, p.
232-234):
Pr(T








2￿2)41. As the starting point is now anyt 2 [T ￿;1);we can immediately
see in (51) the dependence on both V r
t and Vt:
Since the option value under pro￿t regulation is zero, if V 0 is never reached we get
F r(VT0) = 0: On the contrary, if V 0 is reached and the contract is revoked; it is simply






According to the Strong Markov Property of Vt equation (51) becomes:










where ￿ < 0 is the negative root of (35). Since at t the primitive process Vt is greater









￿ 1; we obtain ~ F(Vt;V 0) ￿ F(V 0) for













Since ~ F(Vt;V 0) ￿ F(V ￿) for all t 2 [T ￿;T 0); the regulator￿ s optimal strategy is to
revoke immediately at T ￿. To prevent revocation the pro￿t adjustment must continue
until time T 0￿ ￿ T 0(V ￿) = inf(t ￿ T ￿ j Vt ￿ V ￿ = 0￿) when the trigger value
V 0 = V ￿ is reached for the ￿rst time after T ￿: The game ends and can then be started
afresh. This concludes the second part of the Proposition.
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